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AFRICA-MIDEAST

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January 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Vice Consul King

Previous to our landing in Morocco, the officers in the Army fell into three groups.

The first group, made up for the most part of older officers from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel up, were old military die-hards, incapable of forming any plans or taking any action on their own initiative. Some of these were anti-German, some collaborationists, but none of them would move unless so ordered by Petain, Darlan, Weygaud or Nogues. Exceptions to this were Generals Bethouard, Masse, Monsabert and Lalouille. Typical examples were Generals Lascroux, Dody, Demartin, Berger, Desre, and of course General Nogues.

The second group, consisting of Lieutenant Colonels, Majors and some Captains, consisted of officers who hated the Germans but still could not bring themselves to take or follow any independent action either through their sense of military discipline or because they would not risk their careers and pensions.

The third group comprised of the keenest and ablest officers in the Army of all ranks and ages. Some of them were De Gaullists, others were organizing little resistance groups and some were followers of General Bethouard, Colonel Mollo, etc.

They had lost all faith in Petain and Weygaud did not trust Nogues and would join any Chief who would give them a chance to go on fighting. Many of these were punished and sent to France before we landed. Others were severely reprimanded and sent to other posts even after we landed. General Bethouard's entire staff has been sent back to their regiments or other posts outside of Casablanca.

At least 80% of the rank and file amongst the white troops were on our side. The native troops obeyed their company and regimental officers.

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In view of the facts given, I would suggest the following policy in regard to arming French troops with modern equipment.

(1) Training schools should be established near large French garrisons to instruct French officers and noncoms in the use of modern tanks, armored cars, machine guns, antiaircraft and anti-tank guns and modern high-speed airplanes.

(2) The various regiments and divisions should be armed as soon as they are trained in order to practice divisional tactics, etc.

(3) The arming should be done in the order of the reliability of the various Commanding Officers. For instance, any troops directly under the control and influence of General Giraud could be armed as soon as they are trained. The same applies, of course, to our Generals chosen by Giraud. In Morocco, I would only trust those divisional or regimental Commanders selected by General Bethouard.

As for the Corps Franc under General Monsabert, I believe this should be amongst the first to be armed for I think they will do more to speedily re-establish French military morale than any other unit. At the same time they would not require much heavy equipment as it is our understanding that they will serve as Commando and harassing troops.

By observing this order in arming the various French units, we would not only guard against precious weapons falling into half-hearted or treacherous hands but as the armed units distinguished themselves in action it would build up the prestige of Giraud, etc. and diminish the influence of Nogues and his group.

As an example, I enclose the order issued to Colonel Cau by General Monsabert.

In spite of these orders, Colonel Cau found himself blocked at every turn by Generals Lascroux and Desré. They assured him of their complete willingness to help him in every way but if he asked for a house for officers, it had just been promised to the Americans. The same applies to cars, passages on planes and gasoline.

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Unless we arm, supply and finance this group, it will be smothered by polite promises and inaction.

I,myself, finally got Colonel Cau two places on a plane for Algiers where he had been called by General Giraud.

David W. King

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COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF
DES FORCES FRANÇAISES
TERRESTRES ET AÉRIENNES
EN AFRIQUE

CORPS FRANC D'AFRIQUE
Etat-Major

ORDRE DE MISSION

Le Colonel CAU

se rendra de manière permanente en Algérie pour l'organisation du Corps Franc d'Afrique (C.F.A.).

Il pourra circuler librement en tous points pour l'accomplissement de sa mission, pouvant emprunter tous modes de locomotion, terrestres et aériens.

Les Autorités Alliées et Françaises sont priées de bien vouloir l'assister en lui facilitant ses déplacements et, le cas échéant en le ravitaillant en carburant etc.

Le présent ordre de mission tient lieu d'ordre de transport.

Casablanca le Décembre 1942
Le Général de MONSABERT
Commandant le C.F.A.
p/C le Colonel CAU
Commandant le C.F.A.M.

Casablanca, le

FRENCH COMMANDO
Head Quarters

MISSION ORDER

Colonel CAU

must permanently go to ALGIERS for organising the French Commando (C.F.A.)

He will be allowed to circulate freely everywhere for doing his charge, to go freely by all means of travelling (by air and land).

The Allied and French Authorities are kindly requested to give him every help to make his movings easier and, as the case may be, supply him with gasolene, oil, tyres, tools etc..

This Mission Order is used as a transport order.

Casablanca December 1942
General de MONSABERT
Commanding the French Commando
p/c Colonel CAU
Commanding the French Commando
in Morocco.

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FROM: Vice Consul Klag

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The second group, consisting of Lieutenant Colonels, Majors and some Captains, consisted of officers who hated the Germans but still could not bring themselves to take or follow any independent action either through their sense of military discipline or because they would not risk their careers and pensions.

The third group comprised of the keenest and ablest officers in the Army of all ranks and ages. Some of them were De Gaullists, others were organising little resistance groups and some were followers of General Bethouard, Colonel Mollo, etc.

They had lost all faith in Petain and Weygaud did not trust Nogues and would join any Chief who would give them a chance to go on fighting. Many of these were punished and sent to France before we landed. Others were severely reprimanded and sent to other posts even after we landed. General Bethouard's entire staff has been sent back to their regiments or other posts outside of Casablanca.

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As an example, I enclose the order issued to Colonel Cau by General Mouscbert.

In spite of these orders, Colonel Cau found himself blocked at every turn by Generals Luperoux and Desre. They assured him of their complete willingness to help him in every way but if he asked for a house for officers, it had just been promised to the Americans. The same applies to cars, passages on planes and gasoline.

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OSS
RESTRICTED
FNB

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

January 13, 1943

Morocco 9964

Enclosed is the copy of a letter which has been received by a member of the staff from a well-informed French lady now residing in Morocco, who has been in the "occupied" and "unoccupied" zones of France in the autumn of 1942. The letter passed in private hands through England. You will notice that in addition to portraying the French reaction to American troops, the letter also makes an interesting comment on the political situation in North Africa.

D. C. Poole

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O S S
RESTRICTED
FN

Rabat
December 14, 1942

The Americans have taken over the air field and their tents are set up in the woods which lie between the Sultan's palace and the race course, just behind our house. They go down to the town in strange little cars which afe, it seems, extremely practical. These Americans are very discreet, and one does not hear the tread of boots - boots - boots, as in France. (But when it comes to drinking!) They are on the whole a fine lot, and they get on well with the population.

At the start they went into the Medina; but one day the veiled women aroused their curiosity and desire, so that they ran after them and tried to remove their veils. Great excitement among the Arabs - complaints of the Sultan; and the Medina was put out of bounds for the troops.

Since then one has seen huge fellows at the gates, very amiable, who keep watch leaning against the wall and gossiping with the people - so different from the Germans who for hours, deaf and mute, without movement, rigid as corpses, their rifle raised to the shoulder, would survey the street attentively. Those of us who have been accustomed to that iron discipline, the extreme impersonal politeness, the absolute sobriety, and who have known the feeling of

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inexorable obedience to the orders of the German army, have been somewhat amazed by the easy-going ways, the apparent absence of hierarchical relationships, and the drinking habits of our dear allies.

And such equipment as they have! It is extraordinary, and everyone here is impressed . . . .

In short, there is a great enthusiasm for the Americans among the population, and young men volunteer and go off to fight exuberantly. But unfortunately those who were yesterday in authority, and wo now remain at the head of the country, do not share these sentiments and are very badly supported by the rest of the population.

Later you shall have more details: to sum up for the moment it need only be remarked that the Americans have left this country in the hands of the representatives of Laval.

France itself, meanwhile, is in a terrible situation. In the zone formerly called occupied, 90% of the population is ready for revolt; 5% - very powerful because it is supported by the Marshall, Laval, and the Germans, are collaborators - mostly representatives of industry and high finance; together with 5% of the little bourgeoisie frightened by Communism. In the "free zone" one can count on 60% being ready to fight the Germans, but 40% work with the Germans and fear Communism. Here in North Africa this proportion is increased by the fear

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of a renewal of Jewish offensiveness, a fear which agitates the Arabs to an even greater degree.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

December 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN

There are attached herewith copies of memoranda from the African Section re Machine tools bought by German Commission.

AJB
D. D.

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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COPY

December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Major David Bruce

FROM: Africa Section

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

I believe that Colonel Donovan likes to see from time to time concrete evidences of particularly interesting work being done in the field. With this in mind I am attaching the following sent to me by David Williamson just as a sample, and w th the suggestion that I destroy same after perusal:

1. A letter from the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden listing machine tools which the Germans were buying in Morocco for shipment to Germany.

2. A report by David King regarding the activities of one "Charlotte" whose underground organization effectively sabotaged all the machines but two, which two would be sabotaged as soon as they have been traced.

It would seem that King is in some measure responsible for "Charlotte" and her organization in which case he deserves to be congratulated.

/s/ I.D.Shapiro

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COPY

October 21, 1942

A-625-3

M E M O R A N D U M

for Colonel Eddy from Vice Consul King.

Machine tools bought by German Commission.

There is enclosed a copy of a letter brought in by CHARLOTTE. The original is in the Files of the Residency. Charlotte informs me (1) that all these machines with the exception of the two marked * on the list have been handed over to the German Commission, and are in course of shipment by rail from Casablanca to Oran or Nemours, from where they will be shipped to France; (2) before such shipment was made, technicians belonging to her group effectively sabotaged the machines so that they will be useless; (3) that the two large machines marked * have not yet been traced by them, but are believed to be in Meknes, where the group is searching for them. When found, all efforts will be made to sabotage them also.

/s/ D. W. King

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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C O P Y

A 625

Wiesbaden, le 2/9/42.

Commission Allemande d' Armistice

A LA DELEGATION FRANCAISE AUPRES DE LA COMMISSION ALLEMANDE D'ARMISTICE
S/commission d'Armement.

OBJECT: Machines-outils à Casablanca.

Les machines outils suivantes se trouvent au depot des chemis de fer du Maroc à Casablanca:

1 tour super-progrès 425 Nr. 5982
1 " " " 425 Nr. 5980
1 " Brown & Sharpe 2 C Nr 1584
1 " Vulcain Nr V 13-7
1 " " Nr V 13-8
1 " " Nr V 13-6
1 Béchler A. Nr. 1132
1 fraiseuse Sal Nr 1480-4
1 " Christeb Nr 1778 type F3 4 (Min. de l'armement)
* 1 machine à fileter Vanderer Nr. 8315
1 Affuteuse Cincinnati Nr 1 D 2 - T1 F 207
* 1 machine à pointer S.I.P. type M.P. 4 Nr 77 F.N. 8204
1 etau limeur Gould et Benhardt.

Ces machines proviennent de la Manufacture Nationale d' Armes à Pari; elles ont été transportées au Maroc peu avant L'Armistice et y sont entreposées.

La Commission allemande d'armistice est interessée à l'achat de ces machines, et, etant donné qu'il s'agit de machines speciales pour l' industrie de guerre dont l' emploi de toute facon ne saurait etre envisage au Marox, elle pense que le Gouvernement Francais sera disposé à les vendre. Il s'agit tout particulierement de la machine à pointer S.I.P.

La Commission allemande d'armistice compte que la Delegation Francaise sera en mesure de lui donner reponse avant la fin du mois.....

(Signé: QUEIS)

Dick

SECRET
STRATEGIC

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SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General

25 August 1942.

Dear Mr. Donovan:

Please accept my sincere thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending me Volumes 1 and 2 of your preliminary study on Morocco. I am looking forward with interest to receiving Volume 3 of the Moroccan study.

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter in which you offer to increase your personnel, I appreciate very much your desire to be of the greatest service. However, in view of the greatest necessity for maintaining the utmost secrecy concerning activities connected with North Africa, I consider it very important not to increase your personnel in that area in the near future. I am aware of the trust that can be imposed on the personnel of your fine organization. However, a change in numbers, the appearance of new faces and increased activity will surely be noticed.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Mr. William J. Donovan,
Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

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Morocco 7/17

August 14, 1942

Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
American Embassy,
London, England.

My dear General Eisenhower:

I am sending to you, through the kindness of General Handy, Volumes 1 and 2 of our preliminary study on Morocco. Similar studies are going forward on Algiers and Tunis, which I will send to you as soon as they are completed. In addition, I am now sending you Volume 3 of the Moroccan study, which contains maps prepared in our Geographic Division which I hope you may find of use.

Would you please let me know if there is anything in this respect wherein we could be of use?

I am increasing our personnel in every respect in your theatre so that you can make the fullest use of our services.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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August 14, 1942

Major General Thomas Handy,
Room 2506,
Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Tom:

Under separate cover I am sending the papers for General Eisenhower. I would not burden you with them, except that General Smith thought I ought to get them to General Eisenhower at once.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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prestige of Haj Thami Glaoui.

It has been the settled policy of the French since the establishment of the Protectorate to weaken gradually the great Caids of the Atlas. It will be remembered that the strength of the caids is a relatively recent phenomenon. The Berber Tribes in the Atlas have formed a matter of independent republics from time immemorial. The three great families of the Glaoui, the Goundafi and the M'Tougui have grown up since 1850, basing their strength on modern fire-arms, on the decay of the Sultans, and on the assistance of European powers.

Since 1912, the Goundafi and M'Tougui families have been considerably weakened by the death of their respective heads and by the division of their inheritance in the same way as is planned for the Glaoui family. The Glaoui himself has had alienated some thirty of the seventy tribes which he once ruled.

It is doubtful therefore that any one person will be able to acquire the position now held by the Glaoui. Of his sons, the eldest and most competent, Si Brahim, was rumored recently to have pro-German sympathies, but there has been no substantiation, and in a recent conversation with Vice Consul Kenneth Pender he expressed pro-Allied sympathies. The other sons seem to have no settled opinion. At present they are still very much dominated by their father, but after his death they would probably vary with every political wind.

The greatest personalities in Southern Morocco might be considered [illegible] Glaoui [illegible]

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of the Pasha of Marrakech, a cousin of the Sultan, has definitely prevailed, as announced in a proclamation by Vice Consul Kenneth W. Pendar enclosed under cover of Despatch No. 345 of January 16, 1941. Haj Mohamed Chingaiti, the Pasha of Tarroudant, is widely admired for his learning and literary talents. He is a man made by the French, however, and so far has avoided taking any firm stand in the present conflict. Neither of these gentlemen has any influence outside of the towns.

Respectfully yours,

H. Earle Russell
American Consul General

800/1[illegible]/ma.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
Copy to the Legation at Tangier.

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AMERICAN CONSULATE

Casablanca, Morocco, January 6, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Possible Successors to the Glaoui in Southern Morocco.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to an informal comment on the Consulate's despatch No. 290 of November 27, 1941, transmitted in a letter dated January 5, 1942, from Mr. Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, which inquired as to possible successors to the Glaoui in the leadership of Southern Morocco and their attitude toward the contending groups in the present war.

At the time of the Glaoui's recent illness the question of his succession was much discussed both by the public and by official circles in Rabat. The general impression given was that the position of Pasha of Marrakech and the many tribes of which the Glaoui was chief would be divided among his sons and nephews and that some tribes would be given to outsiders. Thus the son, El Mamun (the present head of council), was expected to become Pasha of Marrakech, another son was to be chief of Telouet and so on. Family dissension was to be minimized and no individual permitted to obtain too great power.

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April 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Re: Names of Possible Successors to Hadj Thami Glaoui in the Leadership of Southern Morocco.

Si Brahim -- Son of the Glaoui and present Caid of Telouet (expected to become Pasha of Marrakech)

Moulay Larbi El Alaoui -- Khalifa of the Pasha of Marrakech; cousin of the Sultan.

Hadj Mohammed Chinguiti -- Pasha of Taroudant.

The Glaoui family.

The Goundafi family.

The M'Tougui family.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

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April 6, 1948

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Hadj Mohammed Chinguiti -- Pasha of Taroudant.

The Glaoui family.

The Goundafi family.

The M'Tougui family.

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April 9, 1948

Mr. Paul H. Alling,
Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Paul:

Thank you very much for your letter of April 4, enclosing copy of the despatch from the American Consulate at Casablanca, Morocco.

Sincerely yours,

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
NE 740.0011 European War 1939/20234

April 4, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Colonel Donovan:

There is enclosed, as of possible interest to your organization, a copy of a despatch dated February 6, 1942 which has been received by the Department from the American Consulate at Casablanca, Morocco.

Sincerely yours,

Paul H. Alling

Paul H. Alling
Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

From Casablanca, no. 368,
February 6, 1942.

The Honorable

William J. Donovan,

Coordinator of Information.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Department of State

BUREAU / DIVISION NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

William J. Donovan

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ARCHIVES OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
NE 740.0011 European War, 1939/21215

April 4, 1942

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Colonel Donovan:

There is enclosed herewith a copy of a strictly confidential despatch, dated February 7, 1942, which the Department has received from Mr. Robert Murphy regarding an interview with a French military official at Casablanca, Morocco.

Sincerely yours,

Paul H. Alling

Paul H. Alling
Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

From Casablanca,
February 7, 1942.

The Honorable

William J. Donovan,

Coordinator of Information.

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Department of State

BUREAU / DIVISION: NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

William J. Donovan

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AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Casablanca, Morocco, February 7, 1942

AIR MAIL

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Bethouard.

ALGIER

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that during the course of my recent visit to French Morocco I called on General Bethouard, Commanding the French Division in the Casablanca region, at his invitation.

I found General Bethouard unchanged in his expressed sentiments of sympathy for the allied cause and for the United States and if anything more vigorous in his antagonism of everything Nazi. As the Department may recall from recent previous reports, General Bethouard during the regime of General Weygand in French Africa was charged directly with the policy of resistance to the operations of the German Armistice Commission personnel in French Morocco. At General Weygand's departure he passed through a period of anxiety regarding his future military activity and at a moment considered seriously the possibility of departure to join the allied forces in whatever capacity might be available. He is among those who received a personal appeal from General Weygand to remain on in French Africa for the purpose of rendering to France as opposed to the Axis whatever service might be possible. Bethouard

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

believe has been clever enough to grin his smile and ostensibly at least voice support of Darlan. He was recently recalled to Vichy and apparently succeeded in persuading Admiral Darlan of his loyalty. His relations with General Noguès, Resident General at Rabat, are cordial and he enjoys the confidence also of General Juin, Commanding in North Africa.

General Bethouard said first of all that he is convinced that General Weygand will return to resume charge in French Africa. He feels that Admiral Darlan's bark is more impressive than his bite, and that Darlan is convinced that the Axis cannot win the war. He declared that his principal concern is the period of waiting necessary until the tide of battle veers in favor of the Allies and also until American production and military organization reaches a point where it can be used effectively on the African continent. He deplored the recent British reverses in Libya and the depressing effect they are having on French morale in this area. He said that until there is a smashing British victory in Libya it is really too much to expect that French enthusiasm can be rallied to a point where resumption of hostilities would be possible. General Bethouard who participated with credit in the Narvik expedition said that the British record thus far on the land did not unfortunately provide great inspiration from the strictly military point of view but that nevertheless he had great hopes for the future with close Anglo-American cooperation.

Discussion of the Libyan campaign enabled a question

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

regarding what would happen in the event of the arrival of allied forces on the Tunisian frontier. Bethouard said he did not know what Vichy would order done there; he preferred to limit his comments to Morocco saying that we could depend on him to defend this area to the utmost limit of his ability against "the Boches". I then asked whether he thought that American assistance might be needed in such an eventuality and he replied that there was no doubt about it; substantial and immediate assistance would be needed. "You know the weakness of our situation, he said, and we must look to you for help in such a case". I asked him whether he felt able to suggest a program at this time and he replied that in his present situation obviously he is not able to do so. He suggested that he thought we should act with confidence in respect of French Morocco. For example, he said, I cannot keep my troops in training for lack of gasoline. You know how we feel and it would be the greatest encouragement for us to feel that we had your confidence to the extent of providing modest quantities of gasoline for our needs. Our pilots cannot fly, our few tanks cannot move for lack of gasoline. The German Armistice Commission people always sneer at American assistance and repeatedly say that we are silly to believe that the Americans will do anything but plan an invasion of this territory.

I suggested to General Bethouard that we wished to remain closely in contact with him and his brother officers who have his anti-Nazi sentiments, saying that it is essential that mutual confidence be developed and French officers

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

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fully persuaded that the United States is thinking in terms of the welfare of the French people and entertains no aggressive territorial intentions as is hinted about by Axis propaganda.

General Bethouard said that this agreed fully with his own views and that he and his friends are eagerly awaiting the day when American assistance can be counted on to aid France in liberating itself from its present humiliating predicament. "But do urge your people to avoid precipitating an unfortunate, badly-planned sally against Morocco which might result in conflict between the French and Americans. This must be avoided at all costs", said Bethouard. I replied that personally I believe that my Government is thinking in terms of a French demand for aid rather than action which would not be on French invitation; that as he knew we had never evinced the slightest territorial ambition in Africa and were happy in the thought of a friendly anti-Axis administration in this area.

Speaking of the German Armistice Commission personnel General Bethouard said that Herr Theodore Auer, the Economic Delegate with the rank of Consul General, recently returned from Southern Morocco, again has protested vigorously to the French authorities against the activities of American consular agents who, according to Auer, are engaging in active subversive propaganda work including the distribution of tracts among the natives and Europeans. Bethouard, who of course, doesn't wish to be quoted, believes that there is no doubt that the Germans are building up a paper case against our consular representatives in North Africa looking to their expulsion.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

February 20th, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN

SUBJECT: MOROCCO

In order to obtain concrete results out of my mission, as I intend to do, it is essential for me to have proper support in the field, and this support I should expect from men who are at present on duty in North Africa and such other men as we may send out and who would be familiar with the type of work necessary to be done and with my directive interest in this work.

I have had a thorough discussion with Lt. Coster who was appointed Vice Consul for Casablanca. I have also instructed Gordon Browne who has been appointed Vice Consul to Tangier. It is intended to exchange these two men as Browne will be of more value in Morocco than in Tangier.

In addition to the above I have today interviewed Dr. Coon, professor of anthropology at Harvard University, who has had varied and valuable experience in the Riff amongst the various tribes. There was an obstacle to his appointment in the State Department which now, I understand, has been removed. I, therefore, intend to engage this man for our work and to obtain for him a

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

State Department cover attached to Casablanca, and working out of there he could maintain his contacts with the natives. Both he and Browne are willing to stay in the country amongst the natives even if German occupation should take place, and, from this point of view, their service to us is invaluable.

It will probably be necessary to recall one of the Vice Consuls from North Africa to appoint Professor Coon as the quota seems to be filled, and we are taking this matter up with the State Department.

If I could now get a good smart fellow for a passport control officer in Lisbon, I would be pretty well set for operations, and, in this respect, I have several contacts under review.

Would you kindly send a cable in COI code to Eddy to be transmitted by courier to Murphy reading as follows:

> Lt. Colonel Solborg is appointed as Assistant Military Attache Lisbon and Madrid. He will coordinate and direct our activities in Iberian Peninsula and North Africa. Please extend him your closest cooperation and advise such Vice Consuls as you see fit accordingly. You may all look

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

to Colonel Solborg for active support and help.

William J. Donovan

Robert A. Solborg
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

Copy to: Mr. Bruce
Colonel Goodfellow

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

In reply refer to initials and No.
Serial 365516

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

MAR 3 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you for your letter of February 26th with which you transmitted a map and certain pictures of the Moroccan area, supplementing the report prepared by Mr. Coyle which you had forwarded earlier.

This material together with Mr. Davis' report on the same subject is naturally of interest to us and we appreciate your sending it along.

Sincerely yours,

T. S. Wilkinson,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

February 26, 1942

Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold,
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

Following up my letter of February 3, 1942, forwarding to you a copy of a report on airfields in French Morocco by O. E. Coyle, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the map referred to in the second part of Mr. Coyle's report, together with copies of certain pictures of the Morocco area obtained through Mr. Coyle.

In addition, I am also enclosing herewith a report on the same subject by Robert E. Davis, a member of the Glen Martin mission in 1940 to French Morocco, who stayed over after the mission departed and who returned to this country only recently.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

TMcH:JFP

No report filed

Memo ltr sent Scanlon A-2 Lee G-2 Williams OPI

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

February 26, 1942

Brigadier General Martin F. Scanlon,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Scanlon:

Following up my letter of February 3, 1942, forwarding you two copies of a report on airfields in French Morocco by O. W. Coyle, I am enclosing herewith two copies of the map referred to in the second part of Mr. Coyle's report, together with two sets of certain pictures of the Morocco area obtained through Mr. Coyle.

In addition, I am enclosing herewith two copies of a report on the same subject by Robert E. Davis, a member of the 1940 Glen Martin mission to French Morocco, who stayed over after the mission departed, returning to this country only recently.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

TMcD:JIP

No report filed.

Same ltr sent Arnold Lee Wilkinson
War G-2 OMI

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February 26, 1942

Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Lee:

Following up my letter of February 3, 1942, forwarding to you a copy of a report on airfields in French Morocco by O. W. Coyle, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the map referred to in the second part of Mr. Coyle's report, together with copies of certain pictures of the Morocco area obtained through Mr. Coyle.

In addition, I am also enclosing herewith a report on the same subject by Robert E. Davis, a member of the Glen Martin mission in 1940 to French Morocco, who stayed over after the mission departed and who returned to this country only recently.

Very truly yours,

WJD:JTP

William J. Donovan

No report filed
Same ltr sent Hamilton
A-2

Thurman Arnold
AAG
War

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

February 26, 1942

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Admiral Wilkinson:

Following up my letter of February 3, 1942, forwarding to you a copy of a report on airfields in French Morocco by O. W. Coyle, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the map referred to in the second part of Mr. Coyle's report, together with copies of certain pictures of the Morocco area obtained through Mr. Coyle.

In addition, I am also enclosing herewith a report on the same subject by Robert M. Davis, a member of the Glen Martin mission in 1940 to French Morocco, who stayed over after the mission departed and who returned to this country only recently.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

WJMcD:JIP

No report filed

Same ltr sent Scanlon Lt. [redacted] Arnold War
A-2 G-2

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

February 3, 1943

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Wilkinson:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the report on airfields in French Morocco, prepared in this office from data supplied by Mr. O. W. Coyle, whose qualifications are stated in the report, together with a description by Mr. Coyle of certain areas where the terrain is suitable for the construction of additional fields.

Copies of the map referred to in the second statement, as well as copies of certain pictures of the Moroccan area, are not yet available but will be sent to you as soon as they can be obtained.

Brief colored moving pictures, which are of value chiefly for their views of the Casablanca airport and for their showing of the coloration of the country, are also available in this office.

I hope that the above will be of some help to you.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

February 3, 1942.

Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Lee:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the report on airfields in French Morocco, prepared in this office from data supplied by Mr. C. W. Coyle, whose qualifications are stated in the report, together with a description by Mr. Coyle of certain areas where the terrain is suitable for the construction of additional fields.

Copies of the map referred to in the second statement, as well as copies of certain pictures of the Moroccan area, are not yet available but will be sent to you as soon as they can be obtained.

Brief colored moving pictures, which are of value chiefly for their views of the Casablanca airport and for their showing of the coloration of the country, are also available in this office.

I have also, as you may know, asked our representative in Tangier, Colonel Eddy, to procure added

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

details as to Moroccan airfields. His cables are beginning to come in, and I understand that some of them have been sent via Major Bentley in Tangier direct to the War Department. In the interests of centralization, I am asking Colonel Eddy to send all his reports direct to me here, and I shall pass them on to you as soon as they arrive.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

WJD.McN.:JIP

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February 3, 1942

Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold,
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

In accordance with the telephone message received from your office, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the report on airfields in French Morocco prepared in this office from data supplied by Mr. O. W. Coyle, whose qualifications are stated in the report, together with a description by Mr. Coyle of certain areas where the terrain is suitable for the construction of additional fields.

I believe you will find this useful since Mr. Coyle tells us that, while he talked to General Brett for a few moments on his return from Morocco in 1940, he was never really interviewed or asked for a detailed statement by anyone from either the Army or the Navy.

Copies of the map referred to in the second statement, as well as copies of certain pictures of the Moroccan area, are not yet available but will be sent to you as soon as they can be obtained.

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Brief colored moving pictures, which are of value chiefly for their views of the Casablanca airport and for their showing of the coloration of the country, are also available in this office.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

TMcB:JIP

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

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February 3, 1942.

Brigadier General Martin F. Scanlon,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Scanlon:

I am enclosing herewith two copies of a report on airfields in French Morocco, prepared in this office from data supplied by Mr. J. W. Coyle, whose qualifications are stated in the report, together with a description by Mr. Coyle of certain areas where the terrain is suitable for the construction of additional fields.

One copy is for the use of your own group, and the second Captain Carey desired for the use of a War College group concerned with this area.

Copies of the map referred to in the second statement, as well as copies of certain pictures of the Moroccan area, are not yet available but will be sent to you as soon as they can be obtained.

Brief colored moving pictures, which are of value chiefly for their views of the Casablanca airport and for their showing of the coloration of the country, are also available in this office.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

I have also, as you may know, asked our representative in Tangier, Colonel Eddy, to procure added details as to Moroccan airfields. His cables are beginning to come in, and I understand that some of them have been sent via Major Bentley in Tangier direct to the War Department. In the interests of centralization, I am asking Colonel Eddy to send all his reports direct to me here, and I shall pass them on to you as soon as they arrive.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Turner McBaine

DATE February ., 194.

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Mr. O. W. Coyle

I have the following memo from your office:

"General Arnold's office called:

> General Arnold appreciated very much copy of the letter sent to him. When Mr. Coyle first got back from Britain he did talk with Col. [illegible] at that time they got all the information that was necessary but Mr. Coyle now has typed additional report in writing General Arnold would like to have a copy."

Mr. Coyle told me he talked to no one in the Air [illegible] except General Arnold, to whom he talked for about [illegible].

[illegible] a letter for you to sign sending a copy [illegible] to General Arnold, as well as another send- [illegible] copy to General Beaulon.

J.M.B.

T. McB.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

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January 31, 1941

General H. H. Arnold,
Chief of the Air Corps, USA,
Munitions Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Arnold:

We have in the office at the present time Mr. D. W. Coyle, [illegible] Manager for the Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., and from November 26, 1939 to June 23, 1940, head of the Douglas mission in Morocco, acting as chief test pilot and having charge of the Douglas reassembly base at Casablanca.

While in Morocco Mr. Coyle traveled over the country extensively, both by plane and by car, and saw personally many of the airfields there.

Additionally, Mr. Coyle has been an airline pilot since 1927, has accumulated over 13,000 hours, seventy-five per cent of this time in heavy planes, including four-engine ones.

We have obtained a statement from Mr. Coyle covering the details of the airfields which he saw or heard of and the general nature of the terrain surrounding Casablanca. This statement is at present being typed and I shall forward it to you as soon as it is completed.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Gen. H. H. Arnold -2- Jan. 31, 1942

If either you or any of your staff would like to interview Mr. Doyle personally, he would be glad to place himself at your disposal. Since he has never been interviewed by either Military or Naval Intelligence, you may be interested in talking to him before he leaves. Since he plans to leave for the West Coast late this afternoon and may shortly thereafter, I understand, leave this country, I would appreciate an early reply if you desire to see him.

Since your recent request for data on airfields in French Morocco, I have also asked our representative in Tangier, Colonel Eddy, to secure the information and I have just received a cable notifying me that information in detail is being rushed by air pouch and cable to Egypt for relay here. As soon as it arrives I shall forward it to you immediately.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

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SECRET SECRET

CONFERENCE HELD BY SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - [illegible]

PRESENT: The Secretary of the Navy.
The Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral Russell Willson, U.S. Navy.
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S. Navy.
Captain Frank E. Beatty, U.S. Navy.
Commander R. E. Libby, U.S. Navy.
Lieut-Comdr. E. A. Hayes, U.S.N.R.

Col. Robert Solberg, U.S. Army (Attached to G-2, U.S. Army, recently made a trip through North and West Africa.)

Col. Louis Franck, British Army. (Head of Franck Mission, West Africa - Dakar to Cape Town.)

Lieut. C. Dudley Wilkes, U.S.N.R. (Recently Vice Consul in Casablanca, where he spent eight months.)

Mr. I. D. Shapiro, (Naval Academy graduate who had just returned from a trip through North and West Africa.)

Ensign Turner McBaine, U.S.N.R., (Representative of the Cordinator of Information.)

- -

Sec'y Knox: Will you give us some idea as to the size and equipment of air fields near Casablanca?

Lt. Wilkes: As to equipment at the Casablanca airport, of course it does not compare to an American field. But the terrain is good and the location of the airport are very accessible. There is a field at Agadir.

Sec'y Knox: How far is that from Casablanca?

Lt. Wilkes: That is about 300 miles south of Casablanca.

Secy Knox: Suppose you confine yourself to the region and terrain around Casablanca.

Lt. Wilkes: It is wooded. Bunches of trees here and there. Not good for much extension beyond the present fields. There is a second airport at Berrechid. It is listed elsewhere. All this information is in black and white so all I am doing now is to state my personal experience - my own knowledge. I was not, in a military capacity, I was there in a State Department capacity. Around Casablanca - outside the [illegible] airport - the military airport - there is the civilian airport much used by BOAC. They can be known together. [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

Sec'y Knox: Suppose you needed [illegible] planes, [illegible] would you have to disperse planes?

Lt. Wilkes: There are half dozen that could be readily converted. For that purpose they are sufficient.

Secty Knox: They could be used for dispersal of planes? You think that they would be available for that?

Lt. Wilkes: Yes sir. There are at least half dozen within a radius of 50 miles.

Col. Solberg: I would even say more than half dozen. Within a radius of about 80 kilometers, I would say around 16 or 18 available. They are small fields. When we talk about these airdromes, they are actually airdromes. They are better than landing fields, but not first class airports. The terrain however, lends itself to the making of further extensions to the landing facilities. It is pretty hard; it is not sandy. There is a certain amount of clay and some crushed rock.

Sec'y Knox: Is it the kind of [illegible] you could level off easily with one of these graders?

Col. Solberg: I should say it would be very easy. It is the kind of surface that the water runs off of very quickly.

Sec'y Knox: They have one very good, large military airport, say about one mile long with good long runways which would accommodate big planes - say a 5,000 foot runway on it?

Lt. Wilkes: I would say about 4,000 feet.

Col. Solberg: Perhaps 2,000 meters.

Secty Knox: And right next to that touching it, there is a civilian airport - a small one?

Col. Solberg: Yes sir.

Sec'y Knox: In that area within a radius of 50 miles, you think there is possibly up to 16 auxiliary fields that could be arranged?

Col. Solberg: Yes sir.

Sec'y Knox: Are they there now?

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

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Lt. Wilkes: Within 80 kilometers. Within 50 miles, there are at least ten fields that exist, air fields that exist, of which perhaps one half dozen are in use.

Secty Knox: That is rather remarkable in that area.

Lt. Wilkes: The area has been developed from a military standpoint of disbursement and the outlying fields for training, etc. Some of these airfields date from the Riff War, sir.

Col. Solberg: There are as many as 32 air fields that have been developed during the war and some of them cannot be used right away, but with a little work they all can be made useable right away.

Adm. Stark: 32 fields? In what area is that?

Col. Solborg: All the way from Agadir through the valley of Sous right up through Marrakech.

Secty Knox: In what region are these 32 fields?

Lt. Wilkes: In a radius of 300 miles from Casablanca, all through Morocco. You will see the little airplanes marked on the map. About every 20 miles there is one of the auxiliary fields. There are over 100 of them. As far as aviation is concerned, there is no technical difficulty existant in Morocco, if you eliminate the fact that there is no equipment, no gas and no oil.

Col. Solborg: I flew from Casablanca to Dakar, that is a flight of about 10 hours. We landed three times. Once at Agadir, at Tindouf and at Atar. Agadir is a good size landing field. I don't think it deserves the name of airdrome, but it's good sized. Tindouf is an emergency field. Atar is too. It is in the middle of the Mauretania Desert. Anywhere, as far as the eye could see the soil is about the same. It is hard, crushed rock, Saharan Desert. Anywhere there you can establish landing fields. We have landed in the middle of the desert. There are no other improvements there, just a hangar, a military outpost and filling station. The whole country lends itself to flying. All the way from Casablanca to Dakar with the exception of the Atlas Mountain Range. From the Algiers [illegible] we had more trouble.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

Adm. Stark: How about going north or north east from Casablanca [illegible] the straits?

Lt. Wilkes: As far as Larache from Casablanca the ground conditions are about the same. It's all shown on the map.

Adm. Stark: Can you tell us about what the French had there?

Col. Solberg: Yes sir. The total air force when I was there in North Africa, in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, was about 350 planes. There was some Glenn Mes, some Curtises, very few Glenn Martins, and some Douglases. Then they had amphibian planes ——— all kinds. I should say about a group of each, and a group amphibian planes means about 15. It is about the same number of a squadron. They were in pretty poor state of repair. There are practically no spare parts and the air officers told me that these planes would be good for - assuming that one third of the available planes were out of action, - half hours combat, that the balance of the planes would be good for abou ten hours fighting. That is so far as North Africa is concerned. In West Africa, which is a separate command from North Africa, they had about 225 planes, most of them Glenn Martins and Curtises. Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are all under ones Command, that was commanded by General_____, whereas the air force in Western Africa is a separate command under the command of General Gouma, who is very bitterly anti-British.

Adm. Stark: How does he feel about the Germans?

Col. Solberg: He was very friendly toward the Germans.

Ad. Stark: I was going to ask about sentiment in that area.

Col. Solberg: When I arrived there, which was around early March or late February, the sentiment was very friendly toward the Americans, it wasn't too bitterly anti-British, with the exception of the Navy. I don't think Admiral d'Harcourt, who commands the squadron there, is so far anti-British. They play the game there. Early sentiment among the people was one of friendliness to Americans and unfriendliness to British. As time

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

when on this sentiment became much worse, and going toward Pau and [illegible] it was quite amicable toward British and very indifferent as far as we were concerned. The people there promised themselves a lot of things from us in the way of action and help and when that wasn't forthcoming, then they had just written us off as so much talk.

Admiral Stark: Does your map show the location of these fields?

Lt. Wilkes: Yes sir. All those you have got there plus a few others.

Adm. Stark: We may borrow this I suppose?

(?) Lt. Wilkes: Yes sir. That map is from our office.

Lt. Wilkes: Sentiment can be expressed in relation with the French Army that those of the rank of major (-) are 50-50 pro-ally. The other half are collaborationists. Above the rank of major, from lieutenant colonel right up through the generals, the sentiment in the army is pro-ally. In the navy it is exactly the opposite. In the Army German propaganda has led the army officers to believe that there is something in the new order. In the navy it was somewhat different. The navy has got the lion's share out of the disaster in France. They are running France today, so they see something in the future. They have been promised - their chief Darlan has been promised, the command of the European fleet. So all subalterns are playing along with them. The air force can be considered 90% pro-ally, pro-British and even to some extent pro-DeGaullist.

Col. Solborg: They have great admiration of the R.A.F., from a professional point of view. Everything has been done to poison their minds. I remember that I was in Algeria when they assembled all the officers and told them about everything being over there. They said the English had been wrecked now. They said that they should keep quiet and go about their assigned tasks. It didn't go over very well.

Secy Knox: What is your judgement about the effect upon that group in French Africa after the entrance of the United States into an all out war? Certainly they must understand that.

Col. Solborg: I think it undoubtedly had a very salutary effect upon the

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

population as well as upon the armed forces and the navy. There is/ was been that eternal question, "Would America enter the war". They were just as much animated by that question as the Germans were.

Sec. Knox: Then you think the general sentiment with relative to our entrance in the war is very favorable?

Answer: I think so. Yes sir.

Sec. Knox: Has anybody come back since December 7?

Mr. Shapiro: I was in Dakar/ LAST. I was only there about ten days.

Sec.Knox: When was that.

Mr.Shapiro: When I started back I was in Dakar in December. But I lived on board a French war ship for ten days. My ship from Casablanca was wrecked. I spent about ten days on a small French war ship, and during that time had many opportunities to talk things over in the wardroom with the officers, and their opinion at that time was that it was very doubtful as to America ever coming into the war.

Sec. Knox: When was that exactly?

Mr. Shapiro: That was in the last days of November and up to the 5th of December. I landed from that ship at Dakar on the 5th of December.

Sec. Knox: You were in Dakar on the 7th of December weren't you?

Mr. Shapiro: I was in Dakar —— I'm sorry, I said December. That should be November - from the 5th to the 15th of November. The spirit there in Dakar against us was absolutely venomous. The American Consul and I were the only American people in Dakar and the French were shunning us there. They wouldn't even shake hands with us. We Americans were naturally looked on as British agents at Dakar and I think we must expect a little more difficulty there than in Morocco.

Sec. Knox: With your knowledge of the situation and your estimate of the effect of our getting into the war all out would be that it has created a very friendly feeling in French Morocco?

Mr. Wilson: Decidedly so. Yes sir.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

The right people are well advised and are doing everything in their power to help us. And among those right people are some of the leading military authorities. One or two generals have said that they would be delighted to take up arms again with their former allies (i.e. B.E.F.).

Sec. Knox: What about the port itself? What kind of a harbor has Casablanca?

Mr. Shapiro: The harbor at Casablanca is a very modern one, built from scratch, only some 20 to 25 years ago. I don't recall off-hand the number of moles. The equipment on them is all very good. It appears to be in good shape. In that equipment there are many cranes capable of handling very heavy materials. I noticed some equipment there that looked as fine as any I have ever seen in any part of the world. The harbor itself is not very large.

Sec. Knox: How many ships can unload at a time?

Mr. Shapiro: Very roughly, without making a calculation of the plan of the harbor, I would say that they would be able to handle 25 to 30 ships, with proper handling equipment alongside of each vessel.

Mr. Wilkes: The data about the harbor has been cited in The Industrial Encyclopedia of Morocco. I brought it back. What is a tactical study of Morocco has gotten out from an industrial piece. It contains a record of practically all the equipment available.

Adm. Stark: You 25 to 30 ships. What size ships do you refer to?

Mr. Shapiro: I refer to ships of about 10,000 tons. Anywhere from 3,000 to 10,000 tons.

Adm. Stark: Not 25 very large ships - ships of 16,000 - 17,000 tons displacement. I don't think you could handle that many.

Mr. Shapiro: No, sir. They would take very large ships there.

Adm. Stark: How many of that type do you think you could handle, say 600 - 650 feet long?

Mr. Shapiro: A more accurate answer could be made in writing. It out on the map, but off hand I would say 15 or 16 definitely might. [illegible] ships [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

Mr. Shapiro: Yes sir. Utilizing both the miles and sea walls.

Adm. Stark: How much space is now occupied by the French naval vessels?

Mr. Shapiro: Not very much because most of their destroyers are small ships and are all moored to the sea wall. Where they have got them they don't use any wharf space, or practically no wharf space. The JEAN BART is at the pier and one of the cruisers was berthed there. All the other ships, including the small craft, were there (POINTING TO Photograph)

Adm. Stark: How many docks and lighter equipment are there?

Mr. Shapiro: There didn't seem to be enough to me. I can't give you a very accurate or reliable answer to that. All I can give you is just a rough impression that there wasn't enough. We were moored out in the harbor waiting for a convoy to form. From that point I had a good view of the harbor and they looked to be extremely busy.

Adm. Stark: They have to use tugs for berthing the ships?

Mr. Shapiro: Yes sir. I think there is a large platform loading berth there. I don't think they are using these lighters. I'm afraid I can't tell you what that small stuff is there. Along this space here (Pointing to map) is where they had the navy vessels moored.

Sec. Knox: Have you been up and down the shores of Casablanca?

Col. Solberg: Just a little bit. I wanted particularly to look into the Dakar situation; as a matter of fact I was more concerned with the Army and not so much with the navy. We were working up a plan for the defense of North Africa with Staff officers subsequently arrested by Vichy. When at Dakar, I devoted more time to the navy situation there.

Sec. Knox: Are there any other small ports along the coast?

Col. Solberg: There is Mazagan. Then there is Safi. It is very important; and Mogador. Safi has protected water space within the inside of the moles of 72 hectors. Safi is about 150 miles from Casablanca.

Adm. Stark: That is very well protected too?

Col. Solberg: Very well protected.

Sec. Knox: Any small harbors within 150 miles of Casablanca?

Col. Solberg: No sir. Fedala is about all you will find to 25 miles

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

from Casablanca. Then there is Rabat, but it is only 17 feet across on the bar. Between Casablanca and Agadir there are about three.

Sec. Knox: Do any of these lend themselves to landing operations? Do you think Agadir does? That is about 100 miles away, isn't it?

Col. Solberg: It is about 2 and ½ hours flying time. Say 150 miles.

Mr. Wilkes: Agadir is further than that, it is at least 200 miles. Agadir has attractive features because the country lying between Agadir lends itself to easy approach from the sea to the very fertile valley of the Sous. It is well protected by the Anti-Atlas chain. Then there is Taroudant.

Adm. Stark: Where's that?

Col. Solborg: Back of Agadir in the valley of the Sous.

Adm. Turner: Agadir harbor is open.

Col. Solborg: Marratch (MARRAKECH) has a population of about 300,000, mostly native. There are only a few whites. Of course with the white troops, there are about 10,000 whites.

Sec. Knox: What about the native troops? What is their attitude, generally speaking?

Col. Solborg: I don't know, but they are responsive to sugar, tea and cotton goods. What they want is plenty of food.

Sec. Knox: What about climate?

Col. Solborg: It is about like California with the accent on the hot side. There are flies, plenty of them, but it is healthy in that part of Africa. Down around Free Town it is quite different.

Sec. Knox: Have you been in Free Town?

Mr. Shapiro: I left Free Town on the 12th of December, and it was terribly hot. It is a tough place for a white man to live.

Col. Francis: Eighteen percent of the British troops were in hospitals. It is not a white man's country.

Mr. Wilkes: Casablanca is.

Col. Francis: No Rabat I would not go for as Casablanca and it is a very

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

difficult country for a white man to survive.

Lt. Wilkes: I stick to my California comparison because it seems very similar to California.

Adm. Stark: What about the conditions at Tradala? Fedala

Answer: It is quite close, I should say about 15 miles. It's an oil port. Most of the oil companies have installations there. In addition to being an oil it's a shipping point for products there of the region.

Adm. Stark: Does it carry very much of a draft in there?

Answer: I have never seen vessels very much of draft going in there. Mostly oil tankers. Not very much - possibly 31½ meters. It was constructed to be the oil port of Morocco. It was expected to handle all the oil for the country. It wouldn't take the SHERIDAN, of course, that's the largest tanker in the world.

Adm. Stark: What about the natives or tribes thereabouts?

Col. Solberg: They are not inimical to us. I think they are rather friendly. The Arabs are impressed with power. They are not very good but are good warriors. They follow the man but not the flag. Contrary to the native troops in the Sudan or the Senegal, who are soldiers all the way through and follow the flag. We impress them by the bigness of our country, by the large way in which we are accustomed to do things, by our generosity of spirit, and I would consider the natives very receptive ground. Of course they could be bought.

Adm. Knox: Would it be very useful to have any sort of action along that line taken there?

Col. Solberg: It must be so timed that our purchase action will immediately result.

Mr. Shapiro: There is a great Jewish population in that country which I think is worth noticing.

Adm. Knox: What is the [redacted]

Mr. Shapiro: I don't know. I am Jewish myself, but I never found out where [redacted]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

the French. I think they would be extremely friendly.

Lt. Wilkes: They have been in that country, some of them, since [illegible] pre-Christian days.

Col. Solberg: That is quite true, only it's an extremely delicate question. At least among the Arabs. You mustn't forget that Hitler has raised the anti-Semitic feeling among the Arabs to a very high pitch. I had a contact with the Sheriff of Casablanca. He belongs to one of the dynasties. There are two dynasties. One, the ruling one, and the other one the on the outside looking in. Consequently, the one outside doesn't feel very warm about the ruling sultan at the present time. Upon several occasions I had conversations with him about the question of Jews. I remember that with my bad Arabic and his very poor French we had a very mixed conversation. He had two expressions - whatever he agreed with he would say "saben". Beyond that there was not very many expressions. But when I told him that the Jewish problem wasn't very large, that there was only 50 million Jews in the whole world, he said "Only 50 million? "Saben" - cut their heads off! It really isn't very comical, but its really the attitude of the most of them. So if we want to gain the Moslem's favor, we will have to handle the subject carefully. Don't you think so Mr. Shapiro?

Mr. Shapiro: Yes, I think so; although you would have help in many small ways from the Jews without asking it.

Lt. Wilkes: You have met the Glaoui, the most powerful war lord in Morocco. He is not quite of that sentiment. He is very pro-American. The subsidy which has been eliminated somewhat and he was not so enthusiastic about the British, nor is he about the French. He used to get quite a bit from the "secret funds" of France.

Col. Solberg: The Glaoui is an international investor. He follows the side which holds his investments and of course if his investments happen to be in the hands of Jewish bankers, why the Jews are his friends. He is certainly the leading war lord in the country. But I think it is a little different [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

Sen. Knox: At least you would say there is a favorable terrain to make to work?

Col. Solborg: Yes sir, of course. But it must be so easy. If you will precede your military moves with a lot of goodies they will go a long way.

Sen. Knox: What kind of goodies do you mean?

Col. Solborg: A loaf of sugar in the right hands goes a long way; coffee or tea, silken stockings, or anything.

Sen. Knox: Is there anything further you can tell me about getting men ashore?

Col. Solborg: The ports are described in that book, the depths are also described - you will find everything described there from Larache to Ifni. That is a Spanish city on the coast. But I can add a bit there: That is, if the British land there they should never go near French Morocco. But they could go into Spanish Morocco and if they would just use Spanish Morocco there is a splendid chance that they could go in there. (Indicating on map) You could land ten divisions in eight hours here. The territory indicated is the beach from Arzila to Cape Spartel. All this land there is as flat as the top of this table and it is hard sand. It is the only beach that would lend itself on the whole coast to any large operations. That is the only place in Morocco that is open to sea landings. It is in Spanish Morocco.

Adm. Stark: At this time of the year the water rolls in pretty badly, doesn't it?

Col. Solborg: No, the only thing to avoid is high tide when there are northwest swells and there are south-west storms. At low tide all this space is a beach a mile wide that isn't protected by a rocky reef. From here to (indicating) Arzila is called the coast of iron. Safi here has splendid protection from the north-west and north-east from the south-west. As far as landing upon the open beach at Safi there is nothing.

Sen. Knox: What would you say the Spanish would do if we made plans to go into there.

Col. Solborg: It is difficult to give anything but my own opinion. In speaking

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

and it is the opinion of Major Beatty also (he is the military attache at Tangier) that the Spanish will not fight a European, he will fight another Spaniard, but if any European comes in he will rise a few shots and give up. I can only give the opinion of the men down the coast or to other Spanish colonies. There is no doubt that their morale is very low indeed. Except at Dakar, where there is a strong German organization. They would fight anyone.

Adm. Stark: But suppose there was a German organization back of these troops?

Col. Solborg: That's quite different. In Rio de Oro there is no German organization.

Adm. Stark: You haven't stated, any of you, as to whether there is any German infiltration?

Mr. Shapiro: In Dakar there definitely is not. That is, up until the time I left. There are French "Quislings" who are probably more dangerous to us than the Germans.

Col. Solborg: You can't compare Western Africa with Northern Afrida. Dakar is very dangerous from every point of view and the hinterland is very difficult.

Adm. Stark: Are the fortifications at Casablanca in this book?

Mr. McClaine: No sir, there's nothing military in that book.

Col. Solborg: The fortifications at Casablanca are medium fortifications. There are six inch guns. I would say that there would be about twelve batteries of three guns each.

Adm. Stark: They have a very good defense them.

Col. Solborg: Yes sir, on that coast yes. But not as good as Dakar. Dakar defenses are practically impregnable today. That is, the firing power, the number of guns, the caliber of the guns and of course Dakar lends itself to defense more than Casablanca. Much of the island of Goree...

Adm. Stark: You assume also, do you, that if any British were landed they might better be landed at Spanish ports than French Morocco?

Col. Solborg: Definitely yes.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

Adm. Stark: I refer chiefly to the sentiment. The French sentiment if the British land would be terrible?

Col. Solberg: Yes sir. You are absolutely right. It would be very bad if the British landed at French Morocco. I think French Morocco is our landing ground. If we show any kind of strength in Casablanca, they won't fire a shot. Dakar is different. Dakar would resist anyone.

Mr. Shapiro: I am in disagreement about Dakar. I think it could be taken by blockade from the sea and cutting of their communications from the interior.

Col. Solberg: You can neutralize Dakar by cutting off Casablanca. With Casablanca in hand you have Dakar hog-tied.

Adm. Wilson: About the question of roads between beaches and the hinterland?

Lt. Wilkes: There are very excellent roads. They couldn't be better. Two to four lanes. They are good military roads. The roads of Morocco were made for military purposes. When Lyautey put these roads in he did a beautiful engineering job. It is a constant grade up. It is so engineered that you haven't a single dip from the bottom to the top, & down the four sides.

Adm. Wilson: How many roads are there? If one was blown up what would you do?

Lt. Wilkes: They are not parallel, if that is what you mean. You will see that from the road maps here. All these roads in heavy red are good roads. Two to four lanes with hard shoulders.

Col. Solberg: We have very detailed road maps in G-2 and there are very large wall maps showing every detail of the roads. We also have a composite map.

Lt. Wilkes: There are 4 small beaches near Casablanca that can be landed on if the surf is not too bad./ The surf would not be too bad there. The breakers are high but you can ride them. That is a small beach. You could operate with an L.C., if you had a good break. It's usually too rough to operate a small boat. They are so small in any case that it is not of interest. Landing in Morocco is possible provided there is very strong air protection.

Gen. Shaw: How many places should we have to go into there with troops?

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

SECRET

Col. Solberg: At least 600 fighters. We should have at least 400 bombers, to keep the Spanish in Spanish Morocco in check. Those bombers based at Casablanca would hold them in check. They wouldn't move if they knew that there was that many.

Sec. Knox: 600 is a lot. Who are you going to use them against? Who are they going to engage? You can assume that the Germans will not be there; and let's assume they are not there, then how many would you need?

Col. Solberg: The 600 fighters and 400 bombers were foreseen in case the Germans were there in opposition. If they were not there about half of that.

Sec. Knox: Then if only the French, half of that, or 300, would be ample?

Col. Solberg: Yes sir. If we come in force I think the odds are that they would not resist is about 70%, and I think I am being conservative. I think it would be higher than that.

Adm. Stark: You think they might even offer you a welcome?

Col. Solberg: If they were certain that we were in not talking, but acting, I think they would offer us help there.

Adm. Stark: Suppose we appeared off the coast in force?

Col. Solberg: I think that that muzzle would be the only way, and under those conditions I am certain that they wouldn't fire a shot at us.

Admiral Stark: As I remember, you say there was some action taken after our talking about going into Dakar and if we talk about Casablanca we might find a similar situation there?

Col. Solberg: Yes sir. Very innocent statements were immediately pounced upon by Vichy and agrandised out of all proportions and they were used as a weapon against us. If our appearance in the Roads of Casablanca could be timed with a simultaneous march in Libia by the English as I am sure that all men of North Africa would submit.

Adm. Wilson: If we need 600 fighters on the assumption that the Germans were there, how many tanks would we need?

Col. Solberg: As they [illegible] of all processes certain five Spanish

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4

Bizerte (also from Biserti in Tunisia along the Riff and in Algeria and going up the coast to Casablanca with one piece on to Casablanca) It was considered that the Germans would use about three armored divisions and two mechanized divisions plus the Spanish troops, which we could place safely at 150,000 Spanish Moroccan troops of infantry, also the Italian troops; that in order to fight an enemy of that magnitude the French thought it would be necessary to have 1,000 planes, all told, 2 armored divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, plus the complete rearming of the existant French forces.

Adm. Stark: That is what they asked us for previously?

Col. Selborg: That was discussed before ——————. That is what they asked us for several months ago. That was in the face of a contemplated invasion by the Germans before the Russian event.

Sec.Knox: What has been the effect of the first German failure before Moscow along the Russian front, and the effect of the British successes so far in Lybia, plus the fact that we have come in the war all out? Isn't that going to be a potent factor?

Col. Selborg: No doubt from the morale point of view.

Sec. Knox: Do you think it would be a wild assumption that we might find a friendly reception if we went there?

Answer: No sir. I certainly think it would not be a wild assumption. I do think a preliminary feeling-out of the ground with the French and by some discreet and authorized person, that would be a wise move.

End.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4